Investigating Economic Inequality And Voter Turnout In The Industrialized Democracies by Freeman, Benjamin
University of Central Florida 
STARS 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 
2005 
Investigating Economic Inequality And Voter Turnout In The 
Industrialized Democracies 
Benjamin Freeman 
University of Central Florida 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd 
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu 
This Masters Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more 
information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu. 
STARS Citation 
Freeman, Benjamin, "Investigating Economic Inequality And Voter Turnout In The Industrialized 
Democracies" (2005). Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019. 319. 
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/319 
INVESTIGATING ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND VOTER 











Benjamin Freeman  




A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
For the degree of Master of Arts 
in the Department of Political Science 
in the College of Arts and Sciences 







TABLE OF CONTENTS 
  
LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................. iii 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................... 4 
Institutional Explanations ............................................................................................... 4 
Political Explanations ..................................................................................................... 6 
Socioeconomic Explanations .......................................................................................... 7 
The Importance of Inequality.......................................................................................... 9 
DATA AND METHODS ................................................................................................. 18 
Economic Variables ...................................................................................................... 20 
Controlling For The Institutional Context .................................................................... 24 
Controlling For The Political Context .......................................................................... 25 
RESULTS ......................................................................................................................... 26 
Welfare State Development .......................................................................................... 31 
DISCUSSION................................................................................................................... 34 
CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................................... 39 
APPENDIX A: STATISTICAL ANALYSES FOR THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
........................................................................................................................................... 41 
APPENDIX B: COUNTRIES AND ELECTION YEARS INCLUDED IN THE 
ANALYSIS....................................................................................................................... 44 
LIST OF REFERENCES.................................................................................................. 46
 ii
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Economic Models of Turnout............................................................................. 27 
Table 2: Models of turnout including institutional, political, and economic variables .... 29 
Table 3: Models of turnout grouped by level of welfare state development .................... 32 
Table 4: Comparison of GDP and inequality means by decade ....................................... 37 
 iii
INTRODUCTION 
The idea that economic conditions influence the electoral process is far from 
novel.  In fact social scientists have been exploring this interplay for more than three 
decades, beginning with the works of Goodhart and Bhansali (1970), Mueller (1970), and 
Kramer (1971), which illustrate the link between the economy and voting behavior in US 
presidential and congressional elections.  Since the time of these initial studies the 
economic voting literature has become immense and expanded rapidly beyond single 
country temporal models to analyze international variations in the impact of the economy 
on turnout and the support given to different parties, with the latter receiving the vast 
majority of attention.  While the field of economic turnout research can trace its roots 
back to Anthony Downs (1957) there remains a substantial void in our understanding of 
how the economy affects turnout as evidenced by the paucity of relevant research.  
Though it has been shown that aggregate macroeconomic performance affects turnout 
rates (Radcliff 1992; Radcliff 1994; Pacek and Radcliff 1995b, 1995c; Aguilar and Pacek 
2000) the impact of economic distribution has yet to be analyzed.  “What are the electoral 
effects of rising income inequality and insecurity? We can cite no published scientific 
paper on that exciting question” (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000, 212). 
In this paper I seek to answer the question posed by Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier by 
analyzing the effect of changes in economic inequality on changes in voter turnout. While 
it is evident that the state of the macroeconomy has an impact on turnout, this is only one 
measure of economic performance.  Another option is to employ a measure of economic 
distribution alongside macroeconomic performance measures such as gross domestic 
product (GDP) that measure the overall growth or decline in the economy. Though it is 
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true that GDP growth must benefit some or all socioeconomic groups, without a measure 
of economic distribution it is impossible to tell who benefits from this growth.  Theories 
of electoral mobilization and withdrawal are predicated on the assumption that the 
consequences of economic decline are felt primarily by the lower classes, however it is 
quite possible that economic decline could come as the result of losses incurred primarily 
by the upper classes.  Thus, previous studies that have found changes in GDP or similar 
figures to be statistically significant predictors of turnout can offer no empirical 
explanation as to how or why this change occurs.   
This analysis will seek to remove part of this mystery by accounting for the way 
in which the overall economic ‘pie’ is sliced.  Fluctuations in economic inequality can 
affect turnout in two ways.  First, as in the case of GDP, voters may turnout to vote based 
upon their preferences for equality, which are independent of the economy’s impact on 
their personal finances.  While this effect has not been empirically supported Mutz and 
Mondak (1997) find support for what they call ‘sociotropic fairness’, “Our respondents 
were substantially more likely to judge the president favorably if they felt that class 
groups had experienced similar rather than dissimilar changes in economic performance” 
(304).  It is important to note that the findings of Mutz and Mondak apply to presidential 
popularity and not the propensity to turnout, nonetheless their work shows the importance 
of equality in shaping political preferences.  On the other hand, the second way in which 
inequality can affect turnout has been readily documented.  There exists a socioeconomic 
bias in electorates wherein the propensity to vote is higher in the upper socioeconomic 
groups than it is in the lower socioeconomic groups.  When economic inequality 
increases more voters may fall into socioeconomic groups where their propensity to vote 
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is reduced.  Thus, fluctuations in the level of economic distribution combined with the 
socioeconomic bias should reveal an inverse relationship between the level of inequality 
and the level of electoral participation. 
In the next section this possibility will be investigated in greater detail along with 
other plausible alternative explanations of turnout.  It will be noted that the institutional 
and political contexts have been shown to be stronger predictors of turnout in cross-
national perspective than have socioeconomic factors.  However, it will also be argued 
that socioeconomic factors are significant, particularly economic inequality, and that the 
socioeconomic bias is a recognized phenomenon in the industrialized democracies.  
Additionally, an argument will be made that studies which have found the level of 
welfare state development to be an important intervening variable in determining the 
economy’s impact on voter turnout are actually capturing the effects of economic 
distribution on turnout. 
The data and methods section will discuss the coding of the variables used to test 
these conjectures, and the pooled model used to investigate these relationships.  The 
results section will clearly show that socioeconomic explanations of turnout are 
significant, even when controlling for institutional and political explanations of turnout.  
Specifically, it will be unambiguously shown that economic distribution is more 
important in determining voter turnout in cross-national perspective than is economic 
growth.  Finally, it will be shown that economic inequality is a significant explanation of 
turnout regardless of the level of welfare state development.  When accounting for 
inequality, the effects of welfare state development on turnout are contrary to those found 
in previous studies. 
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I will analyze these findings in the discussion section and the implications for 
democratic accountability and responsiveness will be addressed.  In the conclusions 
section an agenda for future research will be presented and it will be argued that 
measures of economic distribution should be included in future studies of turnout, 
particularly in regions of the world beyond the industrialized sample utilized here.  
Furthermore, it will be necessary to investigate the effect of fluctuations in economic 
distribution on vote choice, while being aware of the effects of these fluctuations on 
electoral participation.  It will also be argued that further analysis is needed to determine 
if higher turnout does in fact lead to reductions in inequality.    
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Though the literature investigating the relationship between the economy and 
turnout is somewhat sparse there is a plethora of research investigating turnout from other 
perspectives.  The different approaches can be summarized into three groups.  The first 
approach advocates the importance of political institutions in determining turnout.  The 
second approach contends that the political context of individual elections is a significant 




 Democracies come in a multiplicity of forms.  While all democracies guarantee 
some level of political participation for at least some citizens a variety of variables have 
been shown to have a significant influence on the level of turnout across countries.  
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Registration laws that require even the most limited amount of effort have been found to 
depress turnout during the 20th century (Gosnell 1930; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).  
Registration laws represent an additional cost of voting and from a rational choice 
perspective where the benefits of voting are already low even a small added cost could 
create a significant reduction in aggregate levels of turnout. 
 Further, the electoral system can have a strong impact on voter turnout.  In 
proportional representation (PR) systems fewer votes are wasted than in plurality 
systems.  Under PR systems there is a greater probability that a vote is worth more and 
thus the perceived benefits of voting are increased. Lijphart (1994a) finds that the average 
number of parties is 2.0 in plurality, 2.8 in majority, and 3.6 in PR systems, thus under 
PR voters have more available options.  PR systems also encourage the political parties to 
implement mobilization efforts in all geographical areas, including those that would 
likely be ignored by parties in plurality systems (Lijphart 1997).  Not surprisingly it has 
been shown that in PR systems turnout is approximately ten percentage points higher 
than in plurality systems (Blais and Carty 1990; Franklin 2002; Lijphart 1994b).  Within 
PR systems there are also varying degrees of proportional representation due to decisions 
about districting, formulas, tiers, and thresholds.  Thus, institutionalists also feel that as 
the degree of disproportionality between the share of votes and the share of seats rises 
voter turnout will fall (Jackman 1987). 
 Even under PR systems turnout might still be depressed if voters are called to the 
polls too often.  This appears to correspond with governments in which there is a 
separation of powers or widespread use of referendums (i.e. Switzerland and the United 
States).  These two factors together serve to reduce the importance of any one electoral 
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contest and increase costs by repeatedly calling voters to the polls.  Not surprisingly, 
Franklin (2002) finds that salient elections (as measured by these two criteria) have 
turnout rates almost 30 percent higher than non-salient elections.   
 Throughout the literature the most consistent and strongest stimulus to voter 
turnout is compulsory voting.  If the decision to vote is a rational choice for voters (and a 
very precarious one at that) then it follows that the best way to overcome a problem of 
collective action is to adopt legal sanctions to ensure participation (Olson 1965).  Perhaps 
the most striking aspect of research on compulsory voting is that it has such a profound 
effect even though the penalties for non-compliance are often negligible and enforcement 
is limited or non-existent. According to Lijphart’s (1997) review of the literature 
compulsory voting increases turnout by seven to sixteen percentage points. 
 
Political Explanations 
 While institutional variables account for a large amount of between country 
differences there is also considerable variance in the political context within countries 
from one election to the next.  The most obvious of these factors is the competitiveness of 
elections.  In one election an incumbent party that has performed well while in office in 
the eyes of voters may win in a landslide while in the very next election a strong 
opposition party may rise up to defeat the incumbent party by the slimmest of margins.  
In both cases the costs of voting remain equal while the benefits are very different.  In the 
former, the benefit of voting for either the incumbent or an opposition party is low 
because the gulf between the two is so great, whereas in the latter, voters perceive that 
there is a higher benefit for voting (Blais 2000).  Therefore, the more competitive an 
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election is the more likely it is that turnout will increase.  Franklin (2002) finds that 
competitive elections give rise to turnout differences of four to eight percent.   
 The same argument for competitiveness also applies to the leading party or 
coalition’s proximity to majority status.  A party with majority control of government has 
much greater control of policy outputs than do leading parties that control less than a 
majority of the government.  Therefore the benefit of voting increases with the perceived 
proximity of the leading parties vote share to 50 percent.  Regardless of party preference 
it becomes logical for an individual to vote because the stakes of the contest are high.  
Franklin (2002) was the first to utilize this variable and he found that it led to turnout 
differences between four and eight percent. 
 
Socioeconomic Explanations 
 Socioeconomic explanations of turnout contend that social and economic 
variables affect turnout at both the individual and aggregate levels.  If voters are affluent, 
educated, and literate the likelihood that they will actually vote is increased (Filer, 
Kenny, and Morton, 1993).  At the individual level researchers utilize surveys to 
ascertain the socioeconomic characteristics of voters and non-voters, while at the 
aggregate level researchers utilize literacy, education, economic growth, unemployment, 
and inflation rates.  Often the greatest trouble is that the socioeconomic characteristics are 
highly correlated with one another.  For instance, higher wealth often comes as the result 
of higher education and thus it can be difficult to determine which variable is having the 
most influence.  Moreover, in comparative studies it can be taxing to attempt to make 
comparisons regarding levels of educational attainment due to the diversity of 
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educational systems found throughout the world.  Much of the comparative literature has 
relied upon measures of economic development or economic growth such as GDP per 
capita or similar measures as the principal independent variable.  One pioneering work, 
conducted by Radcliff (1992) shows that the election year proportion change in real per 
capita national income did have a significant influence on turnout.  The effect was 
dependent upon the level of welfare state development and the relationship was found to 
be curvilinear, where mobilization (higher turnout) occurred at low and high levels of 
welfare state development while withdrawal (lower turnout) was found in moderate 
welfare states during periods of economic decline. This work, which was later supported 
by Pacek and Radcliff (1995b), might have captured an effect that it was not intended to.  
Welfare spending is the principal means of government control over economic 
distribution; incidentally welfare spending is also the quickest and most effective control 
of economic inequality. Thus, what matters most might not be changes in the level of 
welfare state development or economic growth, but changes in the level of economic 
inequality.   
Governments can modify welfare and taxation systems to suit the interests of their 
supporters or constituents.  For instance, conservative parties can opt to reduce the tax 
burden on the upper class and consequently reduce the amount of government funds 
available for redistribution.  Egalitarian parties may opt to increase taxation and spread 
the resultant public income amongst the lower classes.  Most importantly, this legislation 
can be enacted, realized, and experienced within the short time span between elections.  It 
is therefore quite probable that partisan politicians advocate alteration of welfare 
spending because of the effect that it has on changes in the level of economic distribution, 
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which in turn leads to fluctuations in turnout and consequently party support.  What is 
most disturbing is that as Radcliff (1994) has shown governments are able to avoid 
punishment during times of recession thanks in part to voter abstention, presumably 
amongst those most disadvantaged by the economic decline.  In terms of economic 
distribution, governments that pursue inegalitarian policies might not be punished 
because the people most adversely affected by the new policies just so happen to be the 
same groups that are now less likely to vote.  This possibility will be discussed in greater 
detail later in this paper. 
 
The Importance of Inequality 
The central thesis of this research is that economic distribution is a significant 
predictor of voter turnout.  When inequality rises it is assumed that turnout will fall, 
because a large portion of the electorate will fall into socioeconomic classes that are less 
inclined to vote.  On the other hand, when inequality falls turnout will rise as a greater 
portion of the electorate move into socioeconomic classes where the mean probability of 
voting is higher. But, why should changes in economic distribution matter?  After all, one 
person’s loss is another’s gain and the overall financial well-being of the country is 
unchanged.  It is apparent that inequality is a complex phenomenon that requires further 
elaboration in order to understand its electoral ramifications.   
To begin, when inequality rises it does so unequally (Wade 2004).  While this 
may seem redundant it is important to know that inequality is much more than the rich 
getting richer while the poor become poorer.  The direct economic exchange that this 
theoretical notion implies is simply not found in the empirical data. There is no rich 
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group that extracts an equal amount of money from a group of poor people and then 
divides it up amongst an equal number of rich individuals.  Inequality is just as apparent 
within classes as it is between classes.  Though the rich may get richer while the poor 
become poorer there are rich individuals who gain significantly more so than other rich 
individuals. 
 Most importantly, the sizes of socioeconomic groups are unequal. As of 2000 the 
combined wealth of the 200 most affluent individuals in the world was equal to the 
combined annual income of the poorest 2.5 billion people in the world (Gates 2000).  
While this statistic is on the global level, the same basic fact holds true in individual 
countries.  As of 1990 35.5 percent of all US households had gross incomes below 
$20,000 while only 3.9 percent had incomes above $100,000 (Levy 1993).  If the lower 
class bound is increased to $40,000 then 66.7 percent, or roughly two-thirds, of all 
households are considered lower class.  Thus, for every upper class household there are 
two lower class households.  Similar statistics show this finding to be consistent among 
all the industrialized nations under study here. 
 Compound this with the aforementioned notion that inequality is unequal within 
classes and it becomes obvious that increases in inequality punish far more people than 
they reward (Wade, 2004).  In a democracy where there is perfect equality of the vote, 
when a poor man’s vote has the same weight as a rich man’s, pursuing policies that 
further inequality might seem to be political suicide.  Yet conservative parties all over the 
world advocate, either directly or indirectly, such policies and have been rewarded for 
their efforts (i.e. President Ronald Reagan in the US and Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher in the United Kingdom).  One possible explanation for this is the upper class 
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bias inherent in electorates.  According to this argument, which has been empirically 
illustrated in nearly all industrialized democracies, there is a direct correlation between 
affluence and the probability of voting or otherwise participating in politics.  According 
to a recent American Political Science Association (APSA) Task Force Report US survey 
respondents with incomes over $75,000 were 34 percent more likely to vote than were 
individuals with incomes below $15,000 (APSA Task Force 2004).  When inequality 
rises the income of the more affluent who are more likely to vote rises which in turn 
makes them more likely to vote, whereas the income of the less affluent falls (relatively) 
which in turn makes them less likely to vote.  Thus, it is quite probable that those who 
would punish the incumbent party abstain at a much higher rate than those rewarded by 
inegalitarian policies (Radcliff 1994). 
 Considering that the socioeconomic bias is the principal theoretical mechanism 
that links fluctuations in economic inequality to voter turnout a review of the literature 
documenting the socioeconomic bias and its implications for this research follows. 
 
The Socioeconomic Bias 
 Ironically, the generally accepted belief at the close of the 19th century was that 
the socioeconomic bias would work in favor of the economically disadvantaged. It was 
believed that a rational individual would opt to abstain rather than have his vote “drown 
among the votes of the great crowd” (cited in Tingsten 1937, 184).  Studies of the 
socioeconomic link with turnout in Chicago (Gosnell 1927) and a small town in Ohio 
(Arneson 1925) soon showed that the turnout bias was in fact in favor of the upper class.  
Tingsten (1937) in a review of turnout studies across several nations came to the 
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conclusion that turnout rises with socioeconomic status.  Since that time there has been 
little debate about the direction of socioeconomic bias in political participation. 
Socioeconomically biased turnout has been documented repeatedly in the United 
States and the APSA Task Force Report on American Democracy in an Age of Rising 
Inequality is the latest contribution to research on the socioeconomic bias inherent in the 
American electorate.  In addition this work also provides documentation of the rising rate 
of inequality over the same time period that turnout fell steadily.  According to the task 
force’s analysis the most affluent fifth of the American electorate received 47.7 percent 
of family income in 2001 (APSA Task Force 2004, 652), but this is not shocking 
considering that the top quintile has always held a great proportion of overall income in 
the US.  “What stands out over the past three decades is the sharp and unmistakable 
increase in the concentration of income at the top” (APSA Task Force 2004, 652).  
Critical to this analysis is the observation that the number of Americans who have 
attained upward mobility does not even begin to counter the rise in economic disparities 
among the masses.  
Of equal importance is the task force’s conclusion that unequal economic 
resources lead to unequal political participation rates.  This is also supported by the 
argument of Richard Freeman (2004) that increased levels of economic inequality lead to 
lower turnout rates among the lower classes.  Additionally, the task force finds that 
American government is much more responsive to the desires of the affluent minority 
than to the needs of the masses (i.e. Schattschneider 1960).  Within campaigns and 
political parties this is also true.  Though the work of Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) 
shows that mobilization is important in encouraging citizens to vote, the task force finds 
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that party mobilization efforts are biased towards the more affluent constituents in both 
parties (i.e. Verba 1996).  The work of Rosenstone and Hansen does have important 
relevance for the analysis presented here however.  The authors find that as the number of 
participants in a political activity (voting or otherwise) decreases inequality in 
participation rises (1993, 238).  Furthermore, Rosenstone’s (1982) previous work 
illustrates that the probability of electoral participation decreases not just because of 
poverty, but also because of a decline in financial well being, which is precisely the effect 
hypothesized here. 
While the United States appears to display the strongest evidence of an upper 
class bias in political participation, so strong in fact that some analysts have regarded it as 
exclusively American (Abramson 1995; Piven and Cloward 1998), the same phenomenon 
has been observed in other democracies.  Similar to the findings of Rosenstone and 
Hanson in the United States, studies by Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) and Marsh and Kaase 
(1979) have shown that the socioeconomic bias in political participation is also evident in 
other countries. 
The socioeconomic bias is more pronounced in countries with lower levels of 
voter turnout.  Not surprisingly there is a great deal of evidence documenting the 
socioeconomic bias in Switzerland, which, along with the US has turnout rates that 
routinely fail to reach fifty percent of the voting age population.  The participation gap 
between the least and most educated classes averaged nearly 25 percentage points in 
referenda voting between 1981 and 1991 (Mottier, 1993). In 1991 the gap was 37 
percentage points and Linder (1994, 95-96) refers to this as a “typical profile of a popular 
vote.” 
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Conversely, the class bias is less pronounced in countries with high levels of voter 
turnout.  Topf (1995) actually finds several instances in which the socioeconomic bias 
works in the opposite direction as would be expected, with the less educated being more 
likely to vote than the higher educated.  Overall though for every deviant case such as 
this Topf finds four more with the expected pattern, and studies by Oppenhuis (1995) and 
Dalton (1996) reach approximately the same conclusion.  When countries that adopt 
compulsory voting measures, and consequently have very high turnout rates, are 
excluded from analyses such as these the upper class bias becomes even more apparent.  
Yet even in countries that adopt compulsory voting the socioeconomic bias is still 
apparent.  McAllister (1986) finds that fluctuations in turnout correspond to fluctuations 
in party support in Australia.  In a cross national analysis of 19 industrialized 
democracies that included several countries that had adopted compulsory voting Pacek 
and Radcliff (1995a) discover a similar pattern. “The results imply that the left share of 
the vote increases by about one-third of a point for every percentage point increase in 
turnout” (139).  It is interesting to note that the authors also included a dummy variable 
for mandatory voting, which was found to be insignificant.   
Not only is the socioeconomic bias still apparent in countries where compulsory 
voting is adopted, though much less so, it also appears that if compulsory voting laws are 
abolished a strong socioeconomic bias will be reintroduced.  In countries that have done 
away with compulsory voting, such as the Netherlands, it has been shown that the class 
bias increased significantly (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978).  In 1967 under compulsory 
voting turnout rates were above 90 percent for all five educational classes in the 
Netherlands.  Whereas in the 1970 election when the country was no longer under 
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compulsory voting the turnout gap between the lowest and highest educational groups 
was 21 percent (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978, 7).  Studies of the potential abolishment of 
compulsory voting in other countries also reveal that a strong class bias would result.  For 
instance, Ackaert and De Winter (1993; De Winter and Ackaert 1994) find that 
abolishment of compulsory voting in Belgium would reduce turnout by more than 30 
points, which would result in a very strong upper class bias in the electorate.  Baloyra and 
Martz (1979) reach a similar conclusion in the case of Venezuela. 
 
The Socioeconomic Bias and Fluctuations in Economic Distribution 
It is apparent that the socioeconomic bias in political participation is a real 
phenomenon in the US and in democracies around the world.  The propensity to turnout 
increases with the level of education and income (which not surprisingly are highly 
correlated).  It is important to note that the level of education and income are relative 
values within countries.  The top quintile in Venezuela is much less affluent than the top 
quintile in the US, yet socioeconomic bias has been identified in both countries.  In short, 
what matters in understanding the socioeconomic bias and consequently turnout is 
relative deprivation and not absolute deprivation.  Though absolute depravation 
undoubtedly matters in explaining turnout the socioeconomic bias does not explicitly 
speak to this and a lengthy discussion of absolute deprivation related to turnout is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
If relative income is positively correlated with turnout then it should follow that 
when economic distribution becomes more unequal, with the top quintile accruing a 
higher share of total income, voter turnout will fall.  The rationale for this is that the 
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upper classes are already predisposed to vote, while turnout among the lower classes is 
largely dependent on their level of income.  Thus, when economic inequality increases it 
places a greater portion of the population into socioeconomic groups where the 
probability of voting is lower.   
This implicitly assumes that the number of voters resulting from a heightened 
socioeconomic status change does not offset the number of abstainers resulting from a 
lower socioeconomic status change.  Simply, the relationship between income and 
propensity to turnout cannot be linear.  If it were then fluctuations in economic 
distribution would have no recognizable impact on turnout.  The change in the probability 
of turnout must be larger at lower levels of income than at higher levels or vice versa in 
order to discern any recognizable change in turnout as the result of fluctuations in the 
distribution of income.  The literature supports the former pattern.  As previously stated it 
is clear that the socioeconomic bias is reduced as turnout rises, accordingly turnout 
increases tend to stem from the less affluent classes.  Additionally, Pacek and Radcliff 
(1995a) clearly show that increases in turnout benefit leftist parties that tend to favor 
egalitarian policies and it is unlikely that increases in turnout stemming from the upper 
classes would lead to a higher vote share for more egalitarian parties.  From a theoretical 
perspective then it is expected that any turnout fluctuations resulting from fluctuations in 
the level of economic distribution are the consequence of higher changes in the 
probability of turnout among the lower socioeconomic groups compared to the upper 
socioeconomic groups. 
In summation, it is expected that rising income inequality will result in lower 
turnout because more potential voters are falling into socioeconomic groups where the 
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probability of voting is significantly diminished.  This effect will not be offset by the 
increased probability of voting resulting from upward mobility, because the change in 
voting propensity is greatest at the lower levels of the economic distribution.  This 
proposition is far from novel; in fact for almost a century political scientists have found 
that “voting frequency rises with rising social standard” (Tingsten 1937, 155). 
 
Welfare State Development 
Powell and Whitten (1993) find that clarity of government responsibility for the 
economy is a significant determinant of the economy’s impact on voter preferences, 
which is supported by Anderson (2000) and Palmer and Whitten (2002).   Thus, it 
follows that those aspects of the economy that governments have greater control over 
during their tenure should be the most salient in determining the level of voter turnout.  
Governments have control over the level of economic distribution through taxation and 
redistributive programs.  Taxation, and particularly progressive taxation, pulls money 
directly from the most economically advantaged and through welfare spending 
governments are able to give that money to more disadvantaged sectors of the population.  
Radcliff (1992) and Pacek and Radcliff (1995b) document this connection between 
welfare spending and economic voting.  In the latter piece the authors find that high 
levels of welfare spending serve to mitigate the effect of economic conditions on the vote 
and in countries with mid to low level welfare systems there is a strong “positivity bias”, 
meaning that governments are rewarded for good economic performance but not 
punished for poor economic performance. Considering that welfare spending has an 
impact on economic inequality it is possible that the welfare state effects observed by 
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Radcliff (1992) and Pacek and Radcliff (1995b) were actually the result of the welfare 
state altering the level of inequality and subsequently voter turnout.  I believe that when 
welfare spending is high economic inequality will be low and because inequality is low 
voter turnout will be high because of the socioeconomic bias mechanism previously 
mentioned.   
Furthermore, it is generally recognized that the level of welfare state development 
is fairly constant over time as Pacek and Radcliff observe.  Yet, individual governments 
(those that serve from one election to the next) are capable of enacting changes in welfare 
spending that alter the level of inequality during the short time span between elections.  
In short, Radcliff (1992) and Pacek and Radcliff (1995b) have shown that welfare state 
development matters when analyzing voter turnout in comparative perspective; this 
analysis will attempt to explain why. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
To test these conjectures the analysis presented below uses a pooled time-series 
dataset of elections for 20 countries from 1970-1999.  The countries are Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, 
and the United States.1  Countries were chosen based upon the availability of inequality 
data and consequently the sample is composed exclusively of Western democracies. The 
elections analyzed are all parliamentary elections during the period under study with the 
exception of the United States.  United States vote totals are for presidential elections, 
due to the high salience of presidential elections in that country.  Due to inequality data 
                                                 
1 For a list of the elections analyzed see Appendix B 
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limitations this provides a pool of 157 elections.  The analysis is conducted using 
standard linear regression. I also tested a cross sectional time series random effects 
regression model and the results were not significantly different.2
The dependent variable is voter turnout.  There are several options for measuring 
it; the actual number of voters can be divided by the: number of registered voters; voting 
age population (VAP); voting age citizens; population eligible to vote.  Adopting the first 
approach overestimates the actual turnout because registering is itself an act of 
participation, and thus participation is being measured strictly among those that are 
already inclined to participate.  The third and fourth measures also overestimate voter 
turnout, though not as dramatically as the first, because estimates of the citizen 
population and the number of eligible voters are notoriously inaccurate and a significant 
amount of those removed from the denominator actually do cast ballots, regardless of the 
legality of that action.  Measuring turnout using voting age population is also flawed, 
because not all of the voting age population is entitled to vote.  Varying amounts of non-
citizens and other disenfranchised individuals such as convicted criminals are included in 
the denominator (Franklin 2002).  However, of the four measures VAP is the only 
conservative measure and for the purposes of this research an underestimation is more 
appropriate than an overestimation because the effects exhibited on turnout using VAP 




                                                 




 The principal independent variables to be evaluated in this analysis are economic, 
and they include: GDP change, unemployment change, inflation, and inequality change.  
GDP is measured in constant 1995 US dollars, gathered from The World Bank’s 
Development Data Group. Using constant US dollars allows for reliable spatial and 
temporal comparisons, and measuring on a per capita basis controls for population 
effects. GDP change is measured as the percentage change in GDP. Calculating this 
figure as a percentage change controls for the different sizes of the economies under 
study.  For example, between 1978 and 1979 Portugal’s GDP per capita in constant 
dollars rose by $285.90 while Luxembourg’s rose by $541.10, thus if overall GDP 
change were used it would appear that Luxembourg’s economy grew much more than 
Portugal’s, while in actuality the percentage change in growth is almost two percent 
higher for Portugal.  In line with the aforementioned notion that individual governments 
have difficulty making meaningful changes to the economy in the short run the change in 
GDP is measured from the year preceding the election as opposed to the year of the last 
election.  This captures election year changes, which are the most proximate and 
prominent during campaigns and when the electorate actually votes.  All of the economic 
variables are measured using change from the year preceding the election.  I hypothesize 
that when GDP falls turnout will fall, corresponding to the findings of Radcliff (1992) 
who also studies a set of industrialized nations.  The principal hypothesis regarding GDP 
is that it will attain significance when not accounting for inequality (as it has in prior 
analyses), but when the effects in the change of inequality are accounted for it will lose 
its explanatory power.   
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Unemployment change is calculated as the percentage change in the 
unemployment rate from the preceding year.  Adopting a percentage measure is also 
valuable for unemployment data because there is high variance in the average 
unemployment rate between countries.  Between 1982 and 1983 the unemployment rate 
rose by a mere .3 in Iceland, which was five times less than the rate increase in Ireland, 
yet the percentage change in unemployment was 43 percent in Iceland and only 16 
percent in Ireland.  The purpose of using a percentage measure here, just as in GDP, is to 
account for the economic context.  Countries with higher unemployment rates such as 
Ireland might celebrate miniscule unemployment rate hikes that would infuriate Icelandic 
voters. I hypothesize that when controlling for economic growth and distribution, 
increased unemployment will lead to higher turnout because of a grievance asymmetry or 
a ‘negativity bias’ in the electorate. 
The inclusion of unemployment change in this analysis also serves the substantive 
purpose of demonstrating that unemployment cannot be used as a surrogate measure of 
economic inequality.  The unemployment rate is purely a measure of the percentage of 
the population that would like to work but cannot, which is only one aspect of the level of 
economic distribution.  While it might be argued that the unemployment rate is a good 
determinant of the level of inequality and that the two are highly correlated the analysis 
presented below reveals that this is not the case.  In fact, the correlation between 
inequality change and unemployment change in the industrialized sample utilized here is 
miniscule.3   
Inflation is simply the inflation rate during the election year in each case.  
Inflation is ordinarily calculated as the percentage change in the consumer price index 
                                                 
3 See Appendix A 
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from one year to the next, so without any further computation the current inflation rate 
conforms to the coding of the other economic variables.  As with unemployment, I 
hypothesize that when controlling for economic growth and distribution, increased 
inflation will lead to higher turnout because of a grievance asymmetry in the electorate. 
For the purposes of this analysis it is important to control for inflation because 
fluctuations in economic distribution are irrelevant if we do not know how these changes 
actually affect the purchasing power of voters.  In this analysis it is believed that 
reductions in inequality increase turnout due to a larger portion of the population falling 
into socioeconomic classes where the propensity to vote is higher.  But, without 
controlling for inflation it is impossible to determine if fluctuations in economic 
distribution are advantageous to the lower classes.  When inequality falls the potential 
gains in turnout could be counteracted by heightened inflation.  Thus, beyond its 
particular impact on turnout it is imperative that inflation be included in the models 
presented below. 
The principal independent variable to be included in this analysis is inequality 
change.  While there are a variety of ways to measure inequality the most commonly 
adopted approach is to use the gini coefficient (Galbraith and Kum 2002).  When 
inequality is low the gini coefficient is small.  The primary problem with the gini 
coefficient, as with all inequality data, is availability.  Deninger and Squire (1996) 
compiled the first comprehensive international time series of gini coefficients.  Though 
the data set is immense the number of figures with national coverage in their ‘acceptable 
data set’ is just over 700 and the dataset is plagued with missing data, which makes 
meaningful calculation extremely difficult. Galbraith and Kum (2004), working under the 
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University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) provide a solution to this by merging the 
Deninger and Squire data with United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO) measures of manufacturing pay inequality and other variables to provide a 
consistent and stable data set of household income inequality.  This data set is highly 
correlated with the Deninger and Squire data set and includes data for a significant 
number of years that were missing or were otherwise unreliable.  Thus, this analysis 
adopts the UTIP-UNIDO data set. 
Like GDP, measuring the change in inequality from the previous year is 
advantageous because it captures election year changes that will be the primary influence 
on the decision to vote.  Though it is possible that inequality could rise before this two-
year time frame it is believed that voters can more readily adapt to these changes before 
the election than they can when changes take place during the year preceding the 
election.  Additional analyses confirm this hypothesis, so for the sake of brevity only the 
measures of inequality from the year preceding the election will be reported here. 
The central hypothesis regarding the inequality variable is that when inequality 
rises turnout will fall as a larger portion of the voting age population falls into 
socioeconomic classes where the average propensity to vote is lower.  Thus, when 
inequality rises withdrawal will result.  Conversely, when inequality falls a larger portion 
of the voting age population will rise into socioeconomic classes where the average 
propensity to vote is higher.  Therefore, when inequality falls it is expected that 
mobilization will result. 
As Radcliff (1992) and Pacek and Radcliff (1995b) have shown the level of 
welfare state development can dramatically influence the effect of the economy on 
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politics.  This proposition will be analyzed in a model that groups countries into either 
high or moderate levels of welfare spending.  The hypothesis here is somewhat different 
than that of Radcliff, because I control for changes in inequality.  As previously 
mentioned, I believe that the effects of the welfare state on turnout observed by Radcliff 
(1992) are actually the result of the welfare state altering the level of inequality and 
subsequently voter turnout. Thus, when controlling for changes in economic inequality it 
is hypothesized that there will be no difference in the effect of the economy (GDP, 
inflation, unemployment, and inequality) on turnout when comparing high and moderate 
welfare countries.  In both the high and moderate models I believe that the coefficient of 
inequality will be statistically significant and have a negative direction of effect. 
 
Controlling For The Institutional Context 
 Institutional explanations of turnout typically include variables such as nationally 
competitive districts (Fornos, Power and Garand 2004), electoral disproportionality 
(Lijphart 1984; Franklin 2002), unicameralism (Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 
1995), and compulsory voting (Franklin 2002; Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995).  
Because this paper is primarily concerned with the influence of the economy on turnout it 
is not vital to determine the individual significance of these institutional variables, 
therefore country dummy variables will be utilized.  These dummy variables combined 
with the use of a lagged turnout variable, “effectively embody the institutional, 
constitutional, and developmental factors that affect long-term turnout levels,” according 
to Radcliff (1992, 445). 
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Controlling For The Political Context 
 Though the dummy variables encompass spatial constraints on turnout it is also 
important to account for temporal variation in turnout that results from changes in the 
political context.  When the value of the vote rises it is expected that turnout will also rise 
(Jackman 1987; Blais and Dobrzynska, 1990; Franklin 2002).  Here the value of the vote 
is based on the proximity of the two leading parties’ vote shares and the majority status of 
the leading party or coalition. 
Competitiveness is the absolute value of the difference between the incumbent 
party’s vote share and the strongest opposition party’s vote share in the current election.  
Though this variable measures the outcome of election campaigns and not the anticipated 
outcome of elections themselves it is probable that there is a high correlation between 
election outcomes and intensity of campaigns.  It is hypothesized that as the margin of 
victory falls turnout will rise.  
Majority status, which was first introduced by Franklin (2002), is measured as the 
leading party’s vote share minus fifty percent. In most democratic governments a simple 
majority is all that is required to enact legislation or change policy, thus it follows that the 
closer a party’s perceived vote share is to majority status then the more important the 
election becomes in determining future policy outputs.  Elections in which the leading 
party is significantly above or below majority status do not carry the same weight with 
voters, because the value of the vote affecting future policy outputs is diminished.  
Consequently, it is hypothesized that turnout will increase as the leading party’s vote 
share approaches majority status. 
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Some scholars hold the belief that time since the last election has a significant 
influence on turnout (Boyd 1981).  However there is limited variation in this variable 
among the industrialized democracies (most countries have elections every 2-5 years) and 
thus previous research has found this variable to be insignificant (Franklin 2002).  Time 
since last election was analyzed here and the same insignificant conclusions were found 
and the exclusion of this variable from the models did not significantly alter other 
variables in the analysis, so the models shown below omit this variable. 
 
RESULTS 
 To begin, I will analyze a basic economic model of turnout for all of the countries 
in the analysis, without controlling for the institutional or political context.  Perhaps the 
most striking aspect of these models is that all of the variables are highly significant, with 
the exception of GDP change in Model 2.   
 Model 1 excludes inequality from the analysis and the remaining measures of the 
economy are highly significant, with both inflation and unemployment change having p 
values below .001 and GDP change having a p value below .01.  The direction of the 
effect is positive for all three variables, which is consistent with all of the corresponding 
hypotheses.  GDP change produces a positive sign, which confirms the withdrawal 
hypothesis argued by Radcliff (1992), wherein economic decline leads to lower rates of 
turnout in the industrialized democracies.  The positive direction of effect on both 
inflation and unemployment change corresponds to the grievance asymmetry hypothesis 
or the negativity bias found in some electorates4.  The magnitude of effect for both 
variables is very high, indicating dramatic gains in turnout when these variables increase, 
                                                 
4 For an explanation of the grievance asymmetry see Pacek and Radcliff, 1995c 
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which would presumably not be advantageous for the incumbent government responsible 
for the economic malfeasance. 
 
 Table 1 
Economic models of turnout 
Variable Model 1  Model 2 
Inequality Change ----  -2.781*** 
    .865 
Inflation .406***  .246** 
  (.104)  (.083) 
Unemployment Change 3.314***  1.982** 
  (1.053)  (.844) 
GDP Change 1.106**  .208 
  (.391)  (.332) 
Constant .707***  .769*** 
  (.016)  (.014) 
R2 .137  .161 
      
N 179  157 
      
Notes:     
Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. Dependent 
Variables is voter turnout. Standard errors are given in 
parentheses below the coefficients.5
* - Significant at the .05 level    
** - Significant at the .01 level    
*** - Significant at the .001 level    
 
Model 2 in Table 1 includes inequality change, which is highly significant with a 
p value below .001.  The direction of the effect is in the hypothesized direction indicating 
that increases in inequality lead to reductions in turnout and the strong magnitude of 
effect tells us that for every one point increase in inequality turnout falls by slightly less 
                                                 
5 Data sources:  Turnout- International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
  Unemployment- US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economics Web Institute 
  Inflation-Economics Web Institute, US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Statistics Canada 
  Inequality- University of Texas Inequality Project 
  GDP- Penn World Tables 
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than three percentage points.  The magnitude of the effect is reduced for both inflation 
and unemployment change, however both remain highly significant and their effects are 
in the hypothesized direction.  GDP change is highly insignificant with a standard error 
that is more than fifty percent larger than its coefficient.  The insignificance of GDP and 
the overwhelming significance and strength of inequality confirms the aforementioned 
hypothesis that what matters in explaining turnout is not economic growth, but economic 
distribution.  It must be noted though that the R² for the second model does not increase 
dramatically with the inclusion of inequality change, the net result is a small change in 
the percent of variation in turnout explained.6
Though the analysis in Table 1 supports all of the expectations regarding the 
economic variables the explanatory power of the model leaves much to be desired. 
Furthermore, like turnout, inequality varies much more between countries than it does 
within them, and without controlling for institutional and political context variables in a 
pooled model it is impossible to tell whether or not the observed effects are simply due to 
institutional and political differences between countries.  When controlling for 
institutional and political context if inequality is able to maintain its significance and 
magnitude we can be much more confident of its importance in the turnout function. 
Table 2 displays the results of this rigorous test with the inclusion of the country 
dummy variables and previous turnout which account for the institutional context, and 
competitiveness and majority status, which account for the political context.  The models, 
as a whole, are very strong predictors of the variance in turnout and the economic 
variables retain much of their significance in these models.  In Model 3 inflation and 
                                                 
6 The reduced sample size in Model 2 (N=157) reflects inequality data limitations. 
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unemployment change have p values below .01 while GDP change is significant at the 
.05 level.  The directions of the effects remain positive as before, but the magnitudes are 
significantly diminished from the pure economic model of turnout.  The political context 
variables, majority status and competitiveness, are significant at the .01 and the .001 level 
 
  Table 2 
Models of turnout including institutional, political, and 
economic variables 
Variable Model 3  Model 4 
Inequality Change ----  -1.186** 
    (.393) 
Inflation .0987**  .0773* 
  (.042)  (.044) 
Unemployment Change .843**  .717* 
  (.35)  (.341) 
GDP Change .303*  .220 
  (.147)  (.145) 
Majority Status .207**  .238*** 
  (.073)  (.076) 
Competitiveness -.166***  -.169*** 
  (.049)  (.050) 
Previous Turnout .423***  .311*** 
  (.082)  (.088) 
Constant .532***  .635*** 
  (.076)  (.080) 
R2 .902  .905 
      
Number of observations 168  157 
      
Notes:     
Table omits country dummy variables. Entries are 
unstandardized regression coefficients. Dependent Variable 
is voter turnout. Standard errors are given in parentheses 
below the coefficients.7
* - Significant at the .05 level    
** - Significant at the .01 level    
*** - Significant at the .001 level    
   
   
                                                 
7 Data sources:  Competitiveness and Majority Status measures derived from data provided by: wikipedia, 
parties-and-elections.de, Adam Carr’s election archive (Australia) 
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respectively.  The direction of effect is in the hypothesized direction for both models.  In 
elections where the leading party approaches 50 percent turnout rises by an average of .2 
percentage points for every percentage point reduction in the gap between the leading 
party’s vote share and 50 percent.  Competitiveness is measured as the incumbent party’s 
vote share minus the leading opposition party’s, so the negative sign reveals that when 
elections are not close voters opt to abstain at a rate of a little more than one and a half 
percentage points for every ten point increase in the vote share gap.  It is interesting to 
note that this figure was also calculated as the absolute difference between the two 
leading parties with no regard for incumbency status and this measure of competitiveness 
(not reported here) was found to be insignificant.  Perhaps it is the ousting or the 
maintaining of an incumbent party that draws voters to the polls and not simply 
competition.  As for the institutional variables, previous turnout is significant at the .001 
level, and nearly all of the country dummy variables are significant at the .05 level or 
greater. 
Model 4 in Table 2 adds inequality change into the model of voter turnout with all 
of the institutional, political, and economic variables.  The political context variables and 
previous turnout are all significant at the .001 level or better.  The directions of their 
effects remain unchanged and the magnitudes of their effect are not appreciably different 
from Model 3, with the exception of previous turnout, which lost approximately 25 
percent of its magnitude with the inclusion of inequality change.  Of the four economic 
variables included in the model inequality change has by far the strongest association 
with turnout and is more significant than any of the other economic variables (b=-1.186, 
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p=.003).  For every one-point increase in the level of inequality turnout falls by slightly 
more than one percentage point.  Inflation and unemployment change remain significant, 
but at the .05 level, and the magnitudes of their effects are reduced.  Most importantly, 
when accounting for the level of inequality GDP change is no longer significant at the .05 
confidence level and the magnitude of effect is reduced by roughly a third.  Though GDP 
change performed better in Model 4 than it did in Model 2 its insignificance provides 
further support for the hypothesis that the economic variable which matters most in 
explaining turnout in comparative perspective is economic distribution, not economic 
growth. 
 
Welfare State Development 
 As previously mentioned Radcliff (1992) found welfare state development to be 
an important determinant of the economy’s influence on turnout.  I argue that the 
observed effect could actually be an economic distribution effect related to the level of 
welfare state development.  To test this conjecture I divide the sample of countries into 
high and low welfare states.  The level of welfare state development is based upon Gosta 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) country ratings of “socialist” criteria, which accounts for 
welfare program universalism and degree of equality in the benefit structure.  The 
moderate welfare states are: Australia, Austria, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain, and the United States.  The high welfare states are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. 
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 Radcliff found that economic growth had a positive effect on turnout in moderate 
welfare states and no effect or a negative effect in extreme welfare states.  In response to 
economic decline voters withdraw in moderate welfare states and mobilize in extreme 
welfare states.  As Table 3 reports, when accounting for changes in inequality the results 
here do not support Radcliff’s findings, in fact the results are the complete opposite of  
 
  Table 3 
Models of turnout grouped by level of welfare state 
development 
Level of Welfare High   Moderate 
Variable Model 5   Model 6 
Inequality Change -1.407**  -.945* 
  (.579)  (.536) 
Inflation .0896*  .0272 
  (.049)  (.110) 
Unemployment Change 1.035*  .464 
  (.525)  (.446) 
GDP Change .343*  .07256 
  (.195)  (.227) 
Majority Status .174  .457*** 
  (.107)  (.117) 
Competitiveness -.0941  -.313*** 
  (.071)  (.076) 
Previous Turnout .417***  .108 
  (.112)  (.147) 
Constant .512***  .741*** 
  (.101)  (.116) 
R² .859  .946 
      
Number of observations 87   65 
      
Notes:     
Table omits country dummy variables. Entries are 
unstandardized regression coefficients. Dependent Variable is 
voter turnout. Standard errors are given in parentheses below 
the coefficients. 
* - Significant at the .05 level    
** - Significant at the .01 level    
*** - Significant at the .001 level     
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Radcliff’s findings.  GDP change is positive in both models, indicating withdrawal, 
significant at the .05 level in the model of high welfare states, but not significant in the 
model of moderate welfare states.  It appears that when accounting for inequality,
 changes in economic growth are only relevant in high welfare states.  Perhaps the 
economic effect that Radcliff observed in the moderate welfare states was the result of 
income fluctuations altering the level of economic distribution and subsequently levels of 
turnout.  This would explain why inequality is statistically significant in Model 6 while 
GDP is insignificant. 
The importance of inequality cannot be understated in these models.  Inequality 
change is the only variable to attain statistical significance in both models. The 
magnitude of effect is also very strong indicating an almost one percentage point decline 
in turnout for every one-point increase in inequality in moderate welfare states and nearly 
a one and a half point decline in turnout for every one point increase in inequality in high 
welfare states.  The higher magnitude and significance in the high welfare states indicates 
that voters are not insulated by their welfare systems. 
 The models reveal a striking difference between the two sets of countries.  In the 
high welfare states the economy has a very strong impact on turnout, while the political 
context variables are insignificant.  In the moderate welfare states just the opposite holds 
true, with the exception of inequality change all of the economic variables are 
insignificant, while the political context variables both have p values below .001.  
Surprisingly, even previous turnout is insignificant in the model of moderate welfare 
states, indicating substantial volatility in turnout rates within these countries. The model 
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explains a great deal of the variance in turnout so it seems that in moderate welfare states 
the political context affects turnout above all else. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 Prior studies of turnout have found that turnout varies as a function of the 
macroeconomy.  But, without the inclusion of a measure of economic distribution it was 
impossible to empirically illustrate how or why this change in turnout came about.  
Considering the well documented socioeconomic bias, which finds that the affluent are 
much more likely to vote than are their lower class counterparts, it becomes apparent that 
the overall level of the economy in itself cannot explain variance in turnout.  It is the 
impact that macroeconomic changes have on the finances of the socioeconomic groups 
that can best explain the economy’s effect on turnout.  When economic inequality is 
small more people will have the economic security and opportunity to participate 
politically, whereas increases in the level of economic inequality consolidate economic 
resources in the hands of a few who are already predisposed to vote while pulling 
resources from the lower classes whose propensity to vote is predicated on their 
economic standing. 
 The analysis presented here has offered empirical evidence to support this 
theoretical notion.  In the models presented above the level of economic growth was 
found to be a significant predictor of turnout, just as in prior analyses of the economy and 
turnout.  But, in models that account for change in the level of economic inequality GDP 
change was found to be insignificant.  Thus, it is safe to assume that the effect of 
economic growth on turnout is largely the end result of economic growth altering the 
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level of inequality.  While it might be argued that economic growth and economic 
inequality are highly correlated further analysis reveals that this is not the case.8
 Perhaps the most intriguing results were those regarding the level of welfare state 
development.  As previously stated when inequality change is accounted for the level of 
welfare state development does not matter in the way that Radcliff (1992) and Pacek and 
Radcliff (1995b) have found.  But, even when accounting for changing inequality welfare 
state development is far from irrelevant as was hypothesized here.  Once inequality 
change is accounted for, the economy has a significant impact on turnout in the high 
welfare states and has an insignificant effect in the moderate welfare states, while the 
opposite is true for the political context variables.  In short, the economy matters in the 
high welfare states and the political context matters in the moderate welfare states.  In 
many ways this is counterintuitive.  In high welfare states the public is provided with a 
safety net and a greater portion of basic necessities are provided for, yet these are the 
countries where the economy is most important in determining turnout.  In the moderate 
welfare states where there is less of a safety net, economic factors are not significant 
predictors of voter turnout (with the exception of inequality change).   
 While this is assuredly a topic that requires further investigation, an initial 
plausible explanation merits discussion.  It is quite possible that those countries that are 
grouped into the high welfare category are also those countries where economic issues 
are of greater concern for voters, which would explain why those countries have high 
welfare systems to begin with.  This amounts to somewhat of a selection bias argument in 
that high welfare states are also those states where the economy matters most.  Perhaps 
this is because of a political culture that places the emphasis for economic success or 
                                                 
8 See Appendix A 
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failure on the individual.  However, the analysis presented here does not speak explicitly 
to this theoretical explanation of the clear divergence between high and moderate welfare 
states.  Further research will be necessary to explore this interesting relationship. 
 The findings here may also have important implications for economic voting.  It is 
often assumed that positive economic performance by the government is rewarded and 
when there is economic decline the incumbent government is punished for it in the next 
election.  While in general this proposition may be true it does not account for changes in 
turnout.  Given the generally accepted fact that political participation is positively related 
to income, during economic recessions “many of the people who would otherwise have 
‘punished’ the government will not turnout” according to Radcliff (1992, 451).  Radcliff 
(1994) investigates this conjecture and finds that there is a “positivity bias” in that 
governments are heavily rewarded for economic success but not readily punished for 
economic decline.  The analysis here would tend to support this “positivity bias” based 
upon changes in electorate composition alone.  As inequality rises the propensity to 
turnout is reduced amongst those most adversely affected by the heightened levels of 
inequality. 
 This prospect is quite discomforting considering the downward spiral that could 
result if policies that engender greater economic inequality are not punished.  Inequality 
could continue to rise and purge a higher proportion of the lower classes from the 
electorate, which would in turn make the future electoral costs of inegalitarian policies 
even lower.  Overtime, economic inequality would steadily increase and turnout rates 
would steadily fall.  In the aggregate this appears to be more than just a theoretical 
notion. The declining rate of turnout over the past three decades has been documented 
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repeatedly, but what has not been nearly as documented is the fact that inequality within 
countries has risen over the same time period (Wade 2004; Hongyi, Squire and Zou 1998; 
APSA Task Force).   
The APSA Task Force Report on American Democracy in an Age of Rising 
Inequality states:  
Indeed, trends in all three areas—citizen voice, government decision making, and public policy—
may together be amplifying the influence of the few and promoting government unresponsiveness 
to the values and needs of the many. Such a negative spiral can, in turn, prompt Americans to 
become increasingly discouraged about the effectiveness of democratic governance, spreading 
cynicism and withdrawal from elections and other arenas of public life.  (APSA Task Force 
Report 2004, 655). 
 
The evidence presented here points to the precise ‘negative spiral’ identified by the task 
force.  Moreover, this analysis includes not only the United States, but also a cross 
section of 19 other industrialized democracies. Table 4 illustrates the mean levels of 
inequality and turnout over the past three decades for the nations analyzed here.  The 
table shows a clear and consistent increase in inequality over the same time period that 
turnout fell steadily.  This provides at least circumstantial evidence that the industrial 
democracies may be caught in a downward cycle of inequality and turnout.  Economic 
inequality is thus offered here as a plausible explanation for the international decline in 
turnout during the last three decades of the 20th century. 
 
  Table 4 
Comparison of GDP and inequality means by decade 
Decade Inequality  Turnout 
1970-79 .332  .8059 
      
1980-89 .353  .7769 
      
1990-2000 .371  .7313 
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 In order to provide further support for this conjecture future research is needed to 
investigate the effect of inequality on incumbent vote swing.  As this analysis has shown 
it will be necessary to control for turnout levels in order to separate turnout effects from 
actual preferences for incumbent parties.  If it is found that turnout fluctuations are the 
leading determinant of support for incumbent parties, as Radcliff (1994) hypothesizes, 
then it would be reasonable to assume that the downward spiral between turnout and 
inequality is a reality in the industrialized democracies.  This possibility would be 
particularly disturbing considering that perhaps the best remedy for low turnout, 
compulsory voting (Lijphart, 1997), would have to be enacted by those who benefit most 
from the elevated levels of inequality. 
 Accordingly, it would be advisable to test the proposition that heightened turnout 
levels do in fact lead to reductions in inequality.  Pacek and Radcliff (1995a) have shown 
that voter turnout is positively related to the vote for left-of-center parties, but the 
question remains whether those leftist parties are actually furthering the cause of 
egalitarianism.  Leftist parties have been found to appeal more to their affluent 
constituents than to their lower class constituents (Verba, et. al. 1996).  Turnout is only 
valuable in reducing levels of inequality if the demands of voters are translated into 
policy outputs.  However, if electoral salience is high and the previously mentioned 
notion regarding government’s ability to shape the level of inequality is accurate, then 
heightened turnout could be one of the most important determinants of levels of 
inequality.  This would provide significant empirical support for the normative claims 




 The substantive conclusions of this analysis are quite clear.  First, when analyzing 
the influence of the economy on turnout change in the level of economic distribution is 
much more important than change in economic growth.  Second, when comparing the 
industrialized democracies, variations in turnout are best explained by the institutional 
and political context of elections.  Yet, even when accounting for these factors inequality 
remains a significant and powerful predictor of turnout.  In fact, inequality is by far the 
most significant economic explanation of turnout tested here.  Third, the level of welfare 
state development conditions the way in which the political and economic variables affect 
turnout.  The economic variables are significant in high welfare states, whereas the 
political context variables are the principal explanatory variables in moderate welfare 
states.  But, inequality is significant in both models possibly indicating that the welfare 
effects identified by Radcliff are primarily the result of inequality effects.  Fourth, the 
incidence of increases in inequality alongside reductions in turnout over the past three 
decades provides justification for the inclusion of inequality and turnout in analyses of 
incumbent vote swings in order to determine if the industrial democracies are caught in a 
cycle of economic punishment for the lower classes and reward for the incumbent 
government. 
Last, the inequality findings suggest that comparative studies of turnout should 
consider levels of economic inequality.  While comparative studies of turnout in the 
industrialized countries are common, recent research has begun to investigate other 
regions of the world, such as Latin America (Fornos et al. 2004; Kinsey and Schraufnagel 
2005).  The effects of inequality fluctuations on turnout in Latin America will be 
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particularly important due to the regions notoriously high levels of economic inequality.  
With the new UTIP dataset, reliable and consistent inequality figures are now available 
for more countries than ever before, and it will be exciting to see if the effects of 
inequality on turnout identified in this analysis apply to countries beyond the 
industrialized sample utilized here. 
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Correlation 1 0.084 -0.123 -0.519** .031 .285** .259**




Correlation .084 1 -.122 .058 -.233** -.033 -.136
  Sig. (2-tailed) .292 - .125 .464 .003 .673 .090
Inflation 
Pearson 
Correlation -.123 -.122 1 .072 .185* -.108 -.085





Correlation -.519** .058 .072 1 -.016 -.149* -.119




Correlation .031 -.233** .185* -.016 1 .045 .224**




Correlation .285** -.033 -.108 -.149* .045 1 .565*




Correlation .259** -.136 -.085 -.119 .224** .565** 1
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .090 .256 .114 .003 .000 - 
 
**- Significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 





















  N Range Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
GDP Change 191 .19 -.07 .12 .0221 .02747
Inequality Change 163 .0802 -.03 .0502 .001900 .0086685
Current Inflation 190 .87 .00 .87 .0949 .11414
Unemployment Change 189 1.8 -.54 1.26 .0626 .24613
Previous Turnout 186 .6 .36 .95 .7807 .12037
Majority Status 192 .61 -.5 .11 -.1496 .11151
Competitiveness 179 .69 -.41 .28 .0640 .10703
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COUNTRY ELECTION YEARS 
Australia 1972 1974 1975 1977 1980 1983 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1998
Austria 1971 1975 1979 1983 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999     
Belgium 1971 1974 1977 1978 1981 1985 1987 1991      
Canada 1972 1974 1979 1980 1984 1988 1993 1997      
Denmark 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1984 1987 1988 1990 1994 1998
Finland 1972 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999      
France 1978 1981 1986 1988          
Germany 1976 1980 1983 1987 1990 1994        
Greece 1974 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1996       
Iceland 1971 1974 1978 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995      
Ireland 1973 1977 1981 1982 1987 1989 1992 1997      
Italy 1972 1976 1979 1983 1987 1992 1994 1996      
Luxembourg 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994         
Netherlands 1971 1972 1977 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998     
Norway 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997       
Portugal 1975 1976 1979 1980 1983 1985 1987       
Spain 1977 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996       
Sweden 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998    
United Kingdom 1970 1974 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997       
United States 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996           
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